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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
CaseNo.20060769-CA

v.

:

ROBERT NICHOLAS DESPATN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West 2004), and driving
under the influence of alcohol/drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN.

§ 41-6-44 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under UTAH CODE

ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issues
1. Did police have probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence
of alcohol or drugs when witnesses reported his dangerous and erratic driving pattern, he
crashed into a parked trailer off the road, his speech was slurred, and he behaved erratically?
2. Was the search of defendant's car permissible under the automobile exception?

Standard of Review
"In search and seizure cases, we review the district court's factual findings 'under a
clearly erroneous standard.'" State v. Ranquist, 2005 UT App 482, f 5, 128 P.3d 1201
(quoting State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15,103 P.3d 699). "We review the trial court's legal
conclusions for correctness, giving no deference to the court's application of the law to the
facts." Id. (citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are attached at Addendum A:
United States Constitution, Amendment IV;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (West 2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.30 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 2,2004, the State filed an information charging defendant with two counts
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, second and third
degree felonies (Count I - methamphetamine; Count II - marijuana), driving under the
influence (Count III), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (Count IV). R l - 3 .
Defendant moved to suppress the drugs and paraphernalia discovered in his vehicle
during a police search. R29-39. After a hearing, the court denied defendant's motion.
R127; R316 (motion hearing). Defendant objected to the findings of fact and conclusions
of law proposed by the State. R136-37. On October 28, 2005, the court heard further
argument regarding the theories justifying the search, and again denied the motion.
Rl 80-81; R322 (hearing). On December 16,2005, the court made final amendments to the
2

State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rl 82-83; see Rl 84-90 (Second
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order) (attached at Addendum B); see
also R322 (hearing).
This Court denied defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal. R249.
Defendant subsequently entered a guilty plea to a reduced count of possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, and driving under the influence, a class B
misdemeanor, reserving his right to appeal the suppression issue. R290-99. On July 28,
2006, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve statutory terms concurrently on both
counts, and suspended the prison term. R303-04.
Defendant timely appealed. R306.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of May 6,2004, defendant smashed his car into a parked trailer after
he swerved in and out of his lane of traffic. R316:4, 6-7. Three eyewitnesses informed the
investigating officers of his erratic driving pattern, and they and attending medical personnel
noted that he was acting erratically, his speech was slurred, and he was paranoid about the
contents of his car. R316:6-9, 22, 29, 36-37. The officers recovered large quantities of
marijuana and methamphetamine from defendant's vehicle. R316:40. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the court made the following factual findings:
1.

On May 6, 2004, Deputy Edward Spotten of the Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Office was dispatched to 2660 South 8000 West on a reported
traffic accident. [R316:4]

2.

Arriving upon the scene at approximately 6:25 p.m., Deputy Spotten
3

observed that a 2001 Blue Saturn SL2 was the vehicle involved in the
accident. [R316:5, 18]
3.

Deputy Spotten observed that this was a single car accident and the car
had crashed into the back end of a parked trailer off the side of the
road. [R316:4]

4.

Deputy Spotten encountered the defendant, Robert Nicholas Despain,
who was the driver of the vehicle. Deputy Spotten also encountered
three other witnesses. [R316:4, 6]

5.

Deputy Spotten approached the defendant to ask some questions. At
this time, the defendant was leaning against the trailer. In response to
Deputy Spotten's questions, the defendant denied having consumed
alcohol or having used any drugs. [R316:7-8, 12-13]

6.

Deputy Spotten noticed that the defendant's speech was slurred while
he was speaking with him. [R316:29]

7.

Deputy Spotten did not smell the odor of alcohol nor marijuana
emanating from the defendant. [R316:13, 15, 32]

8.

Deputy Spotten did not observe drugs or paraphernalia in "plain view"
prior to the search. [R316:25]

9.

The three other witnesses, Brett Lowe, Sasha Strasburg, and Marsha
Gallyer, described to Deputy Spotten what they had observed. They
told Deputy Spotten that they had observed the defendant driving
erratically that [sic] prior to striking the parked trailer. Specifically,
they indicated that the defendant ran another car off the road, ran over
a reflector post, nearly hit a semi tractor trailer, and was swerving
across the entire road. [R316:6-7]1

10.

After speaking with the witnesses, Deputy Spotten decided that he had
probable cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the Influence
("DUI") based on the defendant's reported driving pattern, the accident,
and his demeanor. [R316:8, 15-16, 21, 30-31]

1

Deputy Spotten testified not that defendant's car ran over a reflector post, but
that the car that he ran off the road went over the reflector post. R316:6.
4

11.

Deputy Spotten determined that based on probable cause to arrest the
defendant [for] DUI, the car would be searched "incident to arrest" and
"for inventory purposes" because the vehicle was to be impounded.
[R316:8]

12.

Deputy Spotten did not place the defendant under arrest immediately
because Salt Lake County Fire Department medical personnel had
arrived and had placed the defendant in the ambulance to treat the cut
on the defendant's head that he had sustained from the accident.
[R316:8-9]

13.

B ecause S alt Lake County Fire was preparing to transport the defendant
to the hospital, Deputy Spotten chose not to administer field sobriety
tests. [R316:10, 13-14]

14.

Medical personnel indicated to Deputy Spotten that the defendant was
acting paranoid. They indicated that he was continually worried about
his car. [R316:8-9, 22]

15.

Medical personnel told Deputy Spotten that the defendant had locked
his car to keep people out. [R316:9]

16.

Deputy Spotten retrieved the keys for the car from the defendant to
perform a search of the car. [R316:9]

17.

Deputy Spotten believes that he told the defendant that he was under
arrest when he retrieved the keys, but does not recall. [R316:9, 17]

18.

After unlocking the car but before performing the search, two
individuals, one male and one female, claiming to be related to the
defendant^] arrived on the scene. [R316:9, 24, 39]

19.

These individuals went to the car and the male attempted to retrieve a
backpack from the back seat. [R316:9]

20.

Deputy Spotten instructed the male to stop and return the backpack to
the car. [R316:9-10, 24-25]

21.

Sergeant Jason Mazuran of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office also
responded to the scene. [R316:10, 35]
5

22.

Sergeant Mazuran interacted [with] and observed the defendant.
[R316:36, 42]

23.

Sergeant Mazuran described the defendant's behavior as panicked.
[R316:36-37, 41-42]

24.

In order to assist Deputy Spotten, Sergeant Mazuran initiated an
inventory search of the vehicle. [R316:[R316:10, 37-38, 43]

25.

The search of the vehicle commenced at approximately 6:45 p.m.
[R316:19]

26.

Sergeant Mazuran characterized the search of the vehicle as an
inventory search, in preparation for the vehicle's State Tax
Impoundment. [R316:37-38]

27.

Sergeant Mazuran was aware of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office
procedure for impounding vehicles. [R316:38, 40, 43, 47]

28.

The policy required that the vehicle be searched, items located and
listed on an inventory. [R316:27-28, 38, 43-44]

29.

As he found particular items in the vehicle, Sergeant Mazuran took
those items to Deputy Spotten, and indicated orally where the items had
been found. [R316:44]

30.

Sergeant Mazuran did not personally record in writing the specific
items found or where they were found. [R316:44, 46]

31.

Sergeant Mazuran did not personally prepare a vehicle impound report
in this case, but another deputy on the scene did. [R316:45]

32.

While Sergeant Mazuran began the search, medical personnel indicated
to Deputy Spotten that they were ready to transport the defendant.
Deputy Spotten followed the ambulance to the hospital. [R316:21]

3 3.

Prior to Deputy Spotten's departure, Deputy Mazuran discovered a bag
of marijuana in the door compartment on the driver's side. [R316:3839]

6

33.2

Deputy Spotten stayed in the defendant's presence at all times at the
hospital. [R316:11]

34.

After medical personnel were finished, Deputy Spotten clearly
remembers placing the defendant under arrest. This was at
approximately 7:20 p.m. [R316:18, 21]

35.

Sergeant Mazuran's search of the vehicle produced a backpack and a
box. [R316:40]

34.

Sergeant Mazuran's search of the backpack produced marijuana that
was prepared for distribution. [R316:40]

35.

Deputy Mazuran's search of the box produced a quantity of
methamphetamine. [R316:40]

Rl 84-90 (Second Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, attached at
Addendum B).
Based on these factual findings, the trial court concluded that "Deputy Spotten had
probable cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the Influence." Rl 88. It based that
conclusion on "the erratic driving pattern reported by the witnesses, the single car accident
with a stationary trailer that was off the road, the defendant's panicked and paranoid
demeanor, and the defendant's slurred speech." Id. The court rejected the legitimacy of the
search as incident to arrest. Id. And although the court found there was probable cause to
impound the car under UTAH CODE ANN. 41-6-44.30 (West 2004), it ruled that the
prosecution had failed to present sufficient information for the court to determine whether
the inventory search was properly conducted according to departmental policy.

Id.

Nevertheless, the court concluded that "had the vehicle been towed to the impound lot and
2

The court's findings use the number "33" twice.
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a proper inventory search been conducted, the contraband would have been inevitably
discovered." Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that defendant's arrest for driving under the
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance was based on sufficient probable cause:
Defendant's sustained, erratic driving pattern—running another car off the road, swerving
in and out of his lane of traffic, nearly hitting a semi-tractor trailer, and then colliding with
a parked trailer on the side of the road—strongly indicated chemical impairment; when the
officer who first arrived at the scene contacted defendant, he found defendant's speech to be
slurred; at the scene, medical personnel and another officer witnessed defendant acting
paranoid and erratic. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the officers had sufficient
probable cause to believe that defendant was driving under the influence.
The trial court's ultimate conclusion, that the search of defendant's car was justified,
was correct, albeit on different grounds than relied on by the court. The court ultimately
concluded that evidence of defendant's possession of contraband would inevitably have been
discovered following a properly conducted inventory search at the impound lot. Aplt. Br. at
16-23. The State concedes that this ruling was mistaken because no evidence showed that
the police would have conducted a second inventory search. Nevertheless, the court's
ultimate conclusion should be affirmed on an alternative ground: The search was justified
under the automobile exception.
Under the automobile exception, even if a car is not readily mobile, police may search
8

the vehicle if probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband. The scope of an
otherwise justified search under the automobile exception extends not only to the interior of
the vehicle, but also to closed containers within. The record is unclear whether defendant's
car was mobile after he crashed it into a trailer by the side of the road. Nevertheless, the
search of the interior of the car, and the box and backpack within, was justified under the
automobile exception because the officers had probable cause to believe that contraband was
in defendant's car: Undisputed evidence showed that defendant drove dangerously and
erratically and that his speech was slurred, indicating recent impairment. He also exhibited
unusual paranoia about the contents of his car, and he called two family members to remove
items from the car before the officers could search it. Those facts which, along with facts
indicating drug impairment, would have indicated to an experienced police officer that there
might be contraband in defendant's car.

9

ARGUMENT
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE DID NOT
VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
Defendant asserts that "the arresting officer did not have probable cause to place the
Defendant under arrest for Driving Under the Influence and therefore the officer obtained
evidence in violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights . . . ." Aplt. Br. at 10.3
Specifically, he argues that the factors relied upon by the trial court "are clearly insufficient
to establish probable cause to arrest the Defendant for Driving Under the Influence of alcohol
or a controlled substance." Aplt. Br. at 14. Defendant agrees with the court's conclusion that
the search of his vehicle was not justified under the "search-incident-to-lawful-arrest"
exception, and that the inventory search was not properly conducted. Aplt. Br. at 17.
Therefore, defendant challenges the trial court's ultimate conclusion, that the contraband
would have been inevitably discovered in a subsequent properly conducted inventory search.
Id
Contrary to defendant's claim, his arrest and the police search of his vehicle did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The trial court correctly concluded that the officers had
probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. And because an even greater quantum of
3

Although defendant claims that the search violated his rights under both the
federal and state constitutions, he has not engaged in any independent analysis for his
state constitutional claim. Therefore, this Court should only consider his claim under the
federal constitution. See State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, f 6 n.l, 141 P.3d 602 (citing
State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, \ 12, 125 P.3d 938). "Without analysis, the court can make
no informed decision regarding whether the state constitutional provision in question was
intended to mirror its federal counterpart... ." Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT
26, % 75, 73 P.3d 334.
10

evidence establishes probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in defendant's
car, the officers also were entitled to search the car under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement.

In sum, the police acted within the constraints of the Fourth

Amendment, and, consequently, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence recovered from his car.
A. The police had probable cause to arrest based on his erratic and
dangerous driving pattern, his paranoid and erratic behavior, and his
slurred speech.
Defendant challenges the trial court's determination that Deputy Spotten had probable
cause to arrest him for driving under the influence. He argues that the "only factors"
presented by the State to establish probable cause were that "witnesses observed the
Defendant driving erratically before the accident" and that "emergency personnel told Deputy
Spotten that the Defendant kept worrying about objects inside his vehicle." Aplt. Br. at 14.
"These factors alone," he contends, "are clearly insufficient to establish probable cause to
arrest the Defendant." Id. Although defendant identifies additional evidence supporting
probable cause, namely, his panicked and paranoid behavior, see id., he does not include it
in his analysis under the totality of the circumstances. More importantly, because defendant
misapprehends the test for probable cause, his claim fails. The trial court properly concluded
that police had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI.
"[T]o justify a warrantless arrest 'an officer must have probable cause . . . to believe
that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense.'" State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App
96, f 10, 89 P.3d 185 (quoting State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 26, 57 P.3d 1052) (additional
11

citations and internal quotations omitted). "[W]e do not examine these facts in isolation, but
rather, we examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether '"a prudent person,
or one of reasonable caution would believe, based upon the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit"' the offense for which he is
arrested." Id. at % 11 (quoting State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, f 11, 69 P.3d 293
and State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, \ 27, 57 P.3d 1052). "[P]robable cause is '"only the
probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity."'" State v. Spurgeon, 904
P.2d 220,227 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). "[I]t does not demand any showing
that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, ^f 7
(quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)). Rather, "[a] 'practical, nontechnical'
probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required." Id.
Defendant asserts that Deputy Spotten lacked probable cause because defendant could
drive erratically and act paranoid about the contents of his car for several innocent reasons.
Aplt. Br. at 14-15. However, "[ajlthough there might be innocent explanations for particular
conduct, it is not necessary that all legitimate reasons be absent before an officer finds
probable cause." State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1994). In this case, although
defendant has explained his conduct, post hoc, in innocent terms, this does not eviscerate
probable cause. Indeed, in finding probable cause, this Court need not hold that the
inferences of criminal behavior outweigh those of innocent behavior. See Griffith, 2006 UT
App 291, Tf 7. The facts presented by the State at the suppression hearing show that there was
at least a "probability . . . of criminal activity." Id.; See R191-95 (Addendum B).
12

An officer has probable cause to arrest when there is a probability that a person
"operate[d] or [was] in actual physical control of a vehicle . . . [and] is under the influence
of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to the degree that
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle." UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-644(2)(a)(ii) (West 2004).4 The evidence established probable cause that defendant was
driving under the influence of drugs. Deputy Spotten arrived on the scene of a single car
accident, in which defendant had "crashed into the back end of a parked trailer off the side
of the road." R184. Deputy Spotten spoke briefly with defendant, who was leaning against
the trailer, and noticed that defendant's speech was slurred. R185. In Deputy Spotten's
experience, slurred speech indicated that a suspect might be under the influence of drugs or
alcohol. R316:31. Three eyewitnesses "told Deputy Spotten that they had observed
defendant driving erratically... swerving across the entire road." R185. Specifically, they
saw him run another car off the road, causing it to run over a reflector post. R316:6.
Defendant, they said, continued driving west on highway 201, "driving erratically." R316:7.
When defendant reached the intersection of 80th West, he swerved in front of a semi-truck
to make a left-hand turn, nearly getting hit. Id. Defendant made the turn, and continued
south on 80th West, "again driving erratically, barely staying on the road, and then . . .
swerved left of center and crashed in the back of the parked trailer." Id. Medical personnel
told Deputy Spotten that defendant was acting paranoid about the items in his car. R316:22;
4

In 2005, the Legislature renumbered this section as UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a502 (West Supp. 2006.) 2005 Utah Laws 56-60. However, because the arrest and search
took place in 2004, the State refers to the statutes in force at the time of the offense.
13

Rl 86. In Deputy Spotten's experience, "after an accident most people aren't going to worry
about that at all." Id. Deputy Mazuran verified that defendant was acting panicked. Rl 86;
316:36-37.
Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's driving pattern substantially
increased the probability that defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance,
and was "incapable of safely operating [his] vehicle." Utah CODE ANN. § 44-6-44(2)(a)(ii)
(West 2004). Defendant did not merely veer off the road and strike a parked trailer; he
endangered the lives of several other drivers as he swerved in and out of his lane, forced
another motorist off the road, and nearly crashed into a semi truck. Rl 84-85; R316:7. This
driving pattern indicated to Deputy Spotten, based upon his experience and training as an
officer, that defendant "was under the influence of something." R316:8. At the accident
scene, defendant was leaning against the trailer and his speech was slurred, further increasing
the probability that defendant had been driving while impaired. R185. Moreover, Deputy
Spotten did not witness any other indicia of alcoholic intoxication, which implicitly
suggested to Deputy Spotten that defendant was under the influence of a controlled
substance. R316:8. Although Deputy Spotten did not perform further sobriety tests at the
scene, he explained that he does not perform sobriety tests after an accident. R316:8, 14.
These factors, in combination, established probable cause that defendant was driving under
the influence. See Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 227 ("Probable cause is only the probability, and
not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity." (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Therefore, defendant's arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
14

B. The search was permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement because the officers had probable cause to believe that controlled
substances or evidence of crime were inside defendant's vehicle.
The trial court's ultimate conclusion, that the search of defendant's car was justified,
was correct, albeit on different grounds than relied on by the court. Here, notwithstanding
probable cause to arrest and to impound defendant's car, the trial court ruled that the
prosecution failed to show that there was sufficient information that the inventory search was
conducted according to policy. Rl 88.5 Nevertheless, the court upheld the warrantless search
because the evidence would inevitably have been discovered in a second, properly conducted
inventory search at the impound lot. The State concedes that the court's ruling was mistaken
because no evidence showed that the police would have conducted a second inventory
search. See State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^f 14, 76 P.3d 1159 (requiring prosecution to
demonstrate that police would have inevitably discovered the improperly discovered
evidence through other lawful means. 2003 UT 30, <[ 14. Nevertheless, the court's ultimate
conclusion should be affirmed on the alternative ground that the search was justified under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
"[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on
any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs
from that stated by the [district] court to be the basis of its ruling . . . , was not raised in the

5

The trial court also ruled that the search was not justified incident to arrest.
R188. On appeal, the State neither concedes that the court's rejection of its searchincident-to-arrest or inventory-search theories was correct, but does not contend that it
was incorrect.
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lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court.'" State v. Robison,
2006 UT 65, % 19, 147 P.3d 448 (quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^ 10, 52 P.3d 1158
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Generally, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches and seizures, unless
the search falls under an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d
979, 985 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). One of those recognized exceptions is the "automobile
exception." Generally, '"[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the vehicle without
more.'" State v.Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, f 6,141 P.3d 602 (quoting Maryland v. Dyson,
527 U.S. 465,467 (1999)) (additional citations omitted). The State need not show a separate
exigency. '"[A vehicle] search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the
issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained.'" Maryland
v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (quoting United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982)). Further, the scope of a search justified under the
automobile exception extends not only to the interior of the vehicle, but also to closed
containers within. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999) ("When there is
probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers . . . to
examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for
each one.")
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/. The automobile exception applies even if a defendant's car is immobilized by an
accident.
The automobile exception does not necessarily hinge upon whether a vehicle is readily
mobile. "It is thus clear that the justification to conduct such a warrantless [vehicle] search
does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing
court's assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been
driven away, or that its contents would have been tampered with, during the period required
for the police to obtain a warrant." Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per
curiam). Indeed, the exception applies "even after it has been impounded and is in police
custody." Id. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Although the car's ready
mobility "alone was perhaps the original justification for the vehicle exception, [the United
States Supreme Court's] cases have made clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for
the exception." California v. Carney, All U.S. 386, 391 (1985). "Even in cases where an
automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its
use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception." Id.
Under Carney, the automobile exception extends to automobiles immobilized due to
a recent accident. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 7.2(b) at 555 (4th ed.
2004) ("[I] fit appears that the car has only recently and suddenly become disabled (perhaps
as a result of an accident while pursued by police), then it seems likely that the Carney
doctrine is applicable.

True, the car is not 'readily mobile,' but its recent use as

transportation establishes the 'reduced expectation of privacy' which the language of Carney
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. . . makes the dominant consideration."); see also Cady v. Dumbrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
442-43 (1973) (holding that search of car disabled by accident, while stored in police
impound lot, was reasonable under automobile exception); United States v. Donnelly, 475
F.3d 946,955 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding automobile exception applicable after accident); State
v. Vassar, 99 P.3d 987, 999 (Wyo. 2004) (rejecting argument that automobile exception did
not apply simply because defendant "was hospitalized and his vehicle was damaged and
allegedly immobile").
In this case, defendant had recently operated his vehicle, causing an accident on a
public road. R184. Although the record does not indicate whether defendant's car was
readily mobile after the accident, it was clearly readily mobile prior to the accident.
Therefore, the automobile exception applies to the search in this case if the police had
probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of crime would be found in
defendant's vehicle. See Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261; Carney, All U.S. at 391.
Moreover, an independent exigency justified the search. Defendant had called "family
members" to remove items from the vehicle, and they attempted to do so as soon as the car
doors were unlocked. R186, R316:37, 39. Thus, the officers were on notice even before
they searched the car that a search was necessary to prevent the destruction or removal of
evidence. See State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (noting that "[n]umerous
cases have sustained warrantless entries where the circumstances indicated that evidence
might be destroyed or removed if entry was delayed until a warrant could be obtained," and
citing cases) (emphasis added); State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
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(finding exigent circumstances to search when truck was being towed away and officers
faced situation where defendants were not under arrest and could "have gone with the tow
truck and removed any incriminating items").
2. Under the totality of the circumstances, the police hadprobable cause to believe
that defendant's car contained contraband or evidence of crime.
As discussed above, supra point A, "probable cause is ' "only the probability, and not
a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.'"" State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 227 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). "[I]t does not demand any showing that such a belief be
correct or more likely true than false.

A 'practical, nontechnical' probability that

incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required." Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, f 7
(quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 742). In this case, the officers had probable cause to believe that
defendant's vehicle contained contraband or other evidence of crime, justifying their search
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
When officers arrived at the scene, the circumstances of defendant's car accident
raised their suspicions that defendant was driving under the influence of drugs: Defendant
had swerved off of the road and struck a parked trailer. R184. These suspicions were
confirmed when Deputy Spotten interviewed several witnesses who explained defendant's
erratic driving pattern. R185. This evidence alone would not be sufficient to establish
probable cause that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of crime. However, Deputy
Spotten was also informed by paramedics that defendant was "acting paranoid." R186.
Additionally, Deputy Spotten observed that defendant's speech was slurred. All of this
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evidence suggested to the officer that defendant was DUI for drugs. R316:8. As argued
above, see Pt. A, this evidence sufficiently justified the trial court's ruling that there was
probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. R186. This evidence, however, augmented by
evidence of defendant's highly suspect concern about his car—he was "continually worried
about his car" and its contents—gave rise to probable cause that defendant's DUI was related
to existence of contraband inside the car. R186.
In the suppression hearing, Deputy Spotten explained why this behavior was unusual:
Q: Is it common when people are at an accident scene and they know their car
is being towed they want to secure any personal items, valuables that may
be in the vehicle, before it is towed?
A: Not to this extent usually, no. Usually they - they're usually just - when
people are in accidents they usually don't have concerns of the car until
later on. Then they'll come back and call us and say, "I left this in my car."
Usually after an accident most people aren't going to worry about that at
all.
Q: So if somebody has got stereo equipment, CDs?
A: Typically not. Typically, not Q: Laptops?
A: Typically not the ones that I see, no.
Q: They're not going to be concerned at all about making sure those items are
secure before their vehicle is towed to Impound?
A: In my training and experience in the accident field, that's not something
they are. Most people are concerned about their injuries and what's going
to happen to them.
R316:23. Defendant had even "locked his car to keep people out." R186. Sergeant Mazuran
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confirmed that defendant was acting panicked. R186.
Moreover, "[ajfter unlocking the car but before performing the search, two
individuals, one male and one female, claiming to be related to the defendant arrived on the
scene." R186. "These individuals went to the car and the male attempted to retrieve a
backpack from the back seat." R186. Sergeant Mazuran testified that "[i]t was very
suspicious how it was done," and ordered the male to return the backpack to the car. Rl 86,
316:39. When Sergeant Mazuran searched the car, he found a baggie of marijuana in the
compartment of the driver's door, a backpack containing marijuana that was prepared for
distribution, and a box containing methamphetamine. Rl 87-88.
The officers had probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of crime was
in the car. The totality of the circumstances provided the officers with the "probability that
incriminating evidence [was] involved." Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, ^f 7. This included the
following evidence: The unusual circumstances of defendant's accident; his reportedly
dangerous and erratic driving pattern preceding the accident; his demeanor and slurred
speech; his paranoia regarding the contents of his locked car; and his summoning two
individuals to remove items from the vehicle just before the police began their search. When
viewed together, these circumstances established probable cause to believe that defendant
was under the influence of a controlled substance, and that there was evidence of that
substance inside the vehicle.
Because the automobile exception applies in this case and the officers had probable
cause, the warrantless search of defendant's car was reasonable.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress on the alternative ground that
the search of defendant's car was justified under the automobile exception, and that it affirm
defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J-if

day of April, 2007.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

Addendum A

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

A m e n d m e n t IV. Search and seizure
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

MOTOR VEHICLES

§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination
of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration—Measurement of blood or breath alcohol—Criminal punishment—Arrest without
warrant—Penalties—Suspension or revocation of license
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview with a licensed
mental health therapist:
(i) used to determine if a person is in need of:
(A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse
program;
(B) an educational series; or
(C) a combination of Subsections (l)(a)(i)(A) and (B); and
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health
in accordance with Section 62A-15-105.
(b)(i) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(A) this section;
(B) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10);
(C) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance that is taken illegally in the body;
(D) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a
combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with
Section 41-6-43;
(E) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207;
(F) Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g);
(G) a violation described in Subsections (l)(b)(i)(A) through (F), which
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or
(H) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States which
would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, or a
combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this state,
including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815;
(ii) A plea of guilty or no contest to a violation described in Subsections
(l)(b)(i)(A) through (H) which plea is held in abeyance under Title 77,
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the

charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the
plea in abeyance agreement, for purposes of:
(A) enhancement of penalties under:
(I) this Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless
Driving; and
(II) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; and
(B) expungement under Section 77-18-12.
(c) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and
Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(d) "screening" means a preliminary appraisal of a person:
(i) used to determine if the person is in need of:
(A) an assessment; or
(B) an educational series; and
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health
in accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(e) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death;
(f) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance
abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental
Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(g) j 'substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance
abuse program;
(h) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and
(i) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person
exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
.08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable
of safely operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater
at the time of operation or actual physical control;
(iv)(A) is 21 years of age or older;

(B) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .05 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of
operation or actual physical control; and
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction; or
(v)(A) is 21 years of age or older;
(B) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .05 grams or
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control;
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of
operation or actual physical control; and
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of
violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsections (2)(a)(i) through (iii) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result
of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner;
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of
the offense; or
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of
age in the vehicle at the time of the offense.
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent
manner.
(c) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2)(a)(iv) or (v) is guilty
of:
(i) a class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the person has also inflicted bodily injury
upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a
negligent manner.
(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require
the person to:

(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 48
hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or
"home confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening;
(ii) order the person to participate in an assessment, if it is found
appropriate by a screening under Subsection (4)(c)(i);
(iii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court
does not order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection
(4)(d); and
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $700.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse
treatment is appropriate.
(e)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14).
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol
level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the person in
accordance with Subsection (14).
(5)(a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require
the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 240
hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or
home confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening;
(ii) order the person to participate in an assessment, if it is found
appropriate by a screening under Subsection (5)(c)(i);
(iii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court
does not order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection
(5)(d); and
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $800.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse
treatment is appropriate.

(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with
Subsection (14).
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if
it is:
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of
two or more prior convictions; or
(ii) at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed
after July 1, 2001; or
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1,
2001.
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of
this section.
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of
a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall
impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours.
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive care
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through after
treatment for not less than 240 hours.
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which
may include requiring the person to participate in home confinement through
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a screening; an
assessment, if appropriate; and an educational series; obtain, in the discretion
of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse
treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening, assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in connection
with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or
41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render in connection

with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction
requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6).
(b)(i) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to:
(A) complete all court ordered:
(I) screening;
(II) assessment;
(III) educational series;
(IV) substance abuse treatment; and
(V) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or
(B) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment
costs.
(ii) Upon receiving the notification described in Subsection (8)(b)(i), the
division shall suspend the person's driving privilege in accordance with
Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3).
(9)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute
for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state
for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had
been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant
in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered
under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction of
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9).
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of
this section when the peace officer has probable cause to believe the violation
has occurred, although not in the peace officer's presence, and if the peace
officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was committed by the
person.
(ll)(a) The Driver License Division shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for
the first time under Subsection (2);
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection (2) or i£ the person has a prior conviction
as defined under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a
period of ten years from the date of the prior violation; and

(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court
under Subsection (12).
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension of
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension,
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is
based.
(12)(a)(i) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation of
Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 days,
180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those persons
who have shown they are safety hazards.
(ii) The additional suspension or revocation period provided in this
Subsection (12) shall begin the date on which the individual would be
eligible to reinstate the individual's driving privilege for a violation of
Subsection (2).
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division
an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for a specified
period of time.
(13)(a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert
the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement
units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts.
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which
require:
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the
person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be
monitored; and
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring.
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other
specified location.
(d) The court may:
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a
substance abuse testing instrument;
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the
time the person is subject to home confinement;
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to
attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel directly
between those activities and the person's home; and

(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if
the person is determined to be indigent by the court.
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider.
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by
tne court under Subsection (13)(d)(iv).
(14)(a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e):
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation;
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation.
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation provider.
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and shall
notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that sentence or
those conditions or orders.
(d)(i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court.
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall cover
the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i).
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher,
the court shall order the following, or describe on record why the order or
orders are not appropriate:
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d); and
(b) one or both of the following:
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).

§ 41—6—44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by peace officers—
Impound requirements—Removal of vehicle by owner
(1) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vehicle for violating
Section 41-6-44, 41-6-44.6, or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to
Section 41-6-44 which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the peace officer
shall seize and impound the vehicle in accordance with Section 41-6-102.5,
except as provided under Subsection (2).
(2) If a registered owner of the vehicle, other than the operator, is present at
the time of arrest, the peace officer may release the vehicle to that registered
owner, but only if:
(a) the registered owner:
(i) requests to remove the vehicle from the scene; and
(ii) presents to the peace officer sufficient identification to prove ownership of the vehicle or motorboat;
(b) the registered owner identifies a driver with a valid operator's license
who:
(i) complies with all restrictions of his operator's license; and
(ii) would not, in the judgment of the officer, be in violation of Section
41-6-44, 41-6-44.6, or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section
41-6-44 which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), if permitted to operate the vehicle; and
(c) the vehicle itself is legally operable.
(3) If necessary for transportation of a motorboat for impoundment under
this section, the motorboat's trailer may be used to transport the motorboat.
Laws 1982, 2nd Sp. Sess., c. 4, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 194, § 1; Laws 1984, c. 37, § 1;
Laws 1987, c. 138, § 43; Laws 1991, c. 171, § 2; Laws 1992, c. 1, § 187; Laws 1992, c.
229, § 2; Laws 1996, c. 170, § 44, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 223, § 3, eff. July 1,
1996; Laws 1998, c. 125, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1998, c. 270, § 15, eff. March 21,
1998; Laws 2000, c. 334, § 5, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 202, § 2, eff. July 1, 2001;
Laws 2002, c. 200, § 3, eff. July 1, 2002.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER

-vsROBERTN.DESPATN,

Case No. 041904962

Defendant.

JUDGE DENISE POSSE LINDBERG

Having heard the facts of this case and having heard argument by both parties, the Court
enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On May 6, 2004, Deputy Edward Spotten of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office was dispatched to 2660 South 8000 West on a reported traffic accident.

2.

Arriving upon the scene at approximately 6*25 p m , Deputy Spotten observed
that a 2001 Blue Saturn SL2 was the vehicle involved in the accident.

3.

Deputy Spotten observed that this was a single car accident and the car had
crashed into the back end of a parked trailer off the side of the road.

4.

Deputy Spotten encountered the defendant, Robert Nicholas Despain, who was
the driver of the vehicle. Deputy Spotten also encountered three other witnesses.

)¥

5.

Deputy Spotten approached the defendant to ask some questions. At this time,
the defendant was leaning against the trailer. In response to Deputy Spotten's
questions, the defendant denied having consumed alcohol or having used any
drugs.

6.

Deputy Spotten noticed that the defendant's speech was slurred while he was
speaking with him.

7.

Deputy Spotten did not smell the odor of alcohol nor marijuana emanating from
the defendant.

8.

Deputy Spotten did not observe drugs or paraphernalia in "plain view" prior to
the search.

9.

The three other witnesses, Brett Lowe, Sasha Strasburg, and Marsha Gallyer,
described to Deputy Spotten what they had observed. They told Deputy Spotten
that they had observed the defendant driving erratically that prior to striking the
parked trailer. Specifically, they indicated that the defendant ran another car off
the road, ran over a reflector post, nearly hit a semi tractor trailer, and was
swerving across the entire road.

10.

After speaking with the witnesses, Deputy Spotten decided that he had probable
cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") based on
the defendant's reported driving pattern, the accident, and his demeanor.

11.

Deputy Spotten determined that based on probable cause to arrest the
defendant DUI, the car would be searched "incident to arrest" and "for inventory
purposes" because the vehicle was to be impounded.

12.

Deputy Spotten did not place the defendant under arrest immediately because Salt
Lake County Fire Department medical personnel had arrived and had placed the
defendant in the ambulance to treat the cut on the defendant's head that he had
sustained from the accident.

13.

Because Salt Lake County Fire was preparing to transport the defendant to the
hospital, Deputy Spotten chose not to administer field sobriety tests.

14.

Medical persomiel indicated to Deputy Spotten that the defendant was acting
paranoid. They indicated that he was continually worried about his car.

15.

Medical personnel told Deputy Spotten that the defendant had locked his car to
keep people out

16.

Deputy Spotten retrieved the keys for the car from the defendant to perform a
search of the car.

17.

Deputy Spotten believes that he told the defendant that he was under arrest when
he retrieved the keys, but does not recall.

18.

After unlocking the car but before performing the search, two individuals, one
male and one female, claiming to be related to the defendant arrived on the scene.

19.

These individuals went to the car and the male attempted to retrieve a backpack
from the back seat.

20.

Deputy Spotten instructed the male to stop and return the backpack to the car.

21.

Sergeant Jason Mazuran of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office also responded
to the scene.

22.

Sergeant Mazuran interacted and observed the defendant.

23.

Sergeant Mazuran described the defendant's behavior as panicked.

24.

Li order to assist deputy Spotten, Sergeant Mazuran initiated an inventory search
of the vehicle.

25.

The search of the vehicle commenced at approximately 6:45 p.m.

26.

Sergeant Mazuran characterized the search of the vehicle as an inventory search,
in preparation for the vehicle's State Tax Impoundment.

27.

Sergeant Mazuran was aware of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office procedure
for impounding vehicles.

28.

The policy required that the veliicle be searched, items be located and listed on an
inventory.

29.

As he found particular items in the vehicle, Sergeant Mazuran took those items to
Deputy Spotten, and indicated orally where the items had been found.

30.

Sergeant Mazuran did not personally record in writing the specific items found or
where they were found.

31.

Sergeant Mazuran did not personally prepare a vehicle impound report in this
case, but another deputy on the scene did.

32.

Wliile Sergeant Mazuran began the search, medical personnel indicated to Deputy
Spotten that they were ready to transport the defendant. Deputy Spotten followed
the ambulance to the hospital.

33.

Prior to Deputy Spotten's departure, Deputy Mazuran discovered a bag of
marijuana in the door compartment on the driver's side.

33.

Deputy Spotten stayed in the defendant's presence at all times at the hospital.

34.

After medical persomiel were finished, Deputy Spotten clearly remembers placing
the defendant under arrest. This was at approximately 7:20 p.m.

35.

Sergeant Mazuran's search of the vehicle produced a backpack and a box.

36.

Sergeant Mazuran's search of the backpack produced marijuana that was prepared
for distribution.

37.

Deputy Mazuran's search of the box produced a quantity of methamphetamine.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Deputy Spotten had probable cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Under the
Influence. The probable cause was based on the erratic driving pattern reported
by the witnesses, the single car accident with a stationary trailer that was off the
road, the defendant's panicked and paranoid demeanor, and the defendant's
slurred speech.

2.

The defendant was not actually placed under arrest at the scene; rather, he was
placed under arrest at the hospital.

3.

The State's theory of "search incident to arrest" under these facts is not consistent
with Utah case law.

4.

There was probable cause to impound the car pursuant to Utah Code § 41-6-44.6
and §41-6-44.30.

5.

Insufficient information was presented to the Court to allow it to conclude, one
way or another, whether the inventory search was done according to policy.

6.

The State must show that the inventory search was done according to policy.

7.

The State has failed to carry its burden of showing that the inventory search was
properly carried out.

8.

However, had the vehicle been towed to the impound lot and a proper inventory
search been conducted, the contraband would have been inevitably discovered.
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ORDER
It is hereby ordered that Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED.
SIGNED this 16thday of December, 2005.

BY THE COURT:
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